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Amajor complaint against cultural theories is thatthey cannot explain political change (Lockhart1997). Cultural and institutional accounts of pol-itics are also often seen as antagonistic (Chai1997; Grendstad and Selle 1995; Lockhart 1999).
The cultural theory (CT) developed by Mary Douglas, Aaron
Wildavsky, and others (see, e.g., Schwarz andThompson 1990;
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990), by contrast, oﬀers a
theory of culture that includes a theory of cultural change that
integrates institutions into its explanation of change (Lock-
hart 1997, 1999; Thompson, Ellis, andWildavsky 1990, 69–81;
Wildavsky 1985). Moreover, CT can help specify the cultural
conditions for sudden, big institutional and policy change,
thereby, I argue, strengthening FrankBaumgartner andBryan
Jones’s “punctuated equilibria” (PE) theory of change (Baum-
gartner and Jones 1993, 2002). The plausibility of this CT of
PE change is illustrated in this article by using it to explain
dramatic changes in forest and wildlife management in the
PaciﬁcNorthwest (PNW) (building onSwedlow2002a, b, 2003,
2007, 2009, and 2011a, b).1
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmentalists argued
and federal judges agreed that federal land and wildlife man-
agement agencies were not doing enough to protect the north-
ern spotted owl.These judges enjoined all federal timber sales
in the owl’s range inWashington, Oregon, and Northern Cal-
ifornia and ordered federal agencies to protect not just the
owl but ecosystems. President Clinton appointed a scientiﬁc
advisory committee to respond to these orders. The commit-
tee recommended and the President implemented a plan to
manage ecosystems on 24 million acres of federal land, an
area nearly six times the size of Connecticut, to protect not
just the owl but 1,000 other species associated with older for-
ests.To achieve this, the plan called for a 75%permanent reduc-
tion in federal timber sales, whichwas expected to harm about
300 rural communities.
USING CULTURALTHEORYTO SPECIFYTHE
INTERACTING IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS
OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA THEORY
In PE theory, certain interactions among ideas, interests, and
institutions produce negative feedback, dampening institu-
tional and/or policy change, keeping it incremental or roughly
in equilibrium. Other interactions among ideas, interests, and
institutions produce positive feedback, leading to dramatic
institutional and/or policy changes, punctuating this equilib-
rium. Benjamin Cashore and Michael Howlett (2006, 2007)
use PE theory to explain the same dramatic changes in forest
and wildlife management in the PNW that are the subject of
this article. They emphasize institutional causes of PE, which
they believe are often slighted in PE analyses. Cashore and
Howlett are correct that institutions are important in explain-
ing PE change in this case, but their institutional account is
mis-speciﬁed in that it gives too much agency to “the law”
and too little to courts (Swedlow 2011a) and, as I argue here,
to cultural surprises.
More importantly, no scholar using PE theory has yet sup-
plied a theory about the types of societal interests and govern-
mental institutions that are involved in producing dramatic
policy changes. Consequently, PE scholars have not provided
a theory about what kinds of ideas cause diﬀerent types of
societal interests to demand, and social and political pro-
cesses and governmental institutions to produce, dramatic pol-
icy changes. This article argues that CT can be used to specify
four basic kinds of societal interests and governmental insti-
tutions as well as to specify the sources of cultural surprises
that can lead to PE policy change.
In CT, ideas and interests are seen as reﬂections of beliefs
and values (Wildavsky 1991, 1994), whereas institutions are
viewed asmanifestations of social and political relations (Chai
1997; Grendstad and Selle 1995; Lockhart 1999). Cultural theo-
rists hypothesize that diﬀerent types of social and political
relations are accompanied by beliefs and values, including con-
structs of nature, that allow people to justify these relation-
ships to each other. In other words, diﬀerent kinds of social
and political relations, beliefs, and values are thought to be
interdependent or functionally related. The corollary of this
hypothesis is that these diﬀerent kinds of relations, beliefs,
and values cannot bemixed andmatched.To live one way and
think another is unsustainable, a pathway for cultural change.
Changes in beliefs and values are expected to lead to changes
in relations, and vice versa. Thus, relations constrain beliefs
and values, and beliefs and values constrain relations. Com-
patible relations, beliefs, and values arewhatDouglas and oth-
ers call “cultures,” and compatible beliefs and values together
are what they term “cultural biases” or ideologies (Swedlow
2002b, 2008, 2011b; Thompson, Ellis, andWildavsky 1990).
Douglas and colleagues’ next move is more controversial,
as it involves an attempt to characterize these cultural pack-
ages in a way that is parsimonious and still exhaustive of the
possibilities at a particular level of abstraction. Likemany social
scientists, they think that much of the variation in social and
political relations is captured by the extent of individual auton-
omy and collectivism in those relations.2 Unlike other social
scientists, Douglas and colleagues believe that these condi-
tions are independent of each other rather than inversely
related. Instead of lying on opposite ends of the same contin-
uum, individual autonomy and collectivism vary separately
on their own dimensions. More of one condition does not
necessarily mean less of the other. These dimensions and the
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This conceptual shift allows analysts to account for four,
rather than two, patterns of social and political relations. Peo-
ple in individualistic and fatalistic relations are not part of a col-
lective undertaking, but individualists retain their autonomy,
while fatalistsdonot.People in egalitarianandhierarchical rela-
tions,meanwhile,arepart of a collectiveundertaking, but egal-
itarians retain muchmore of their autonomy than hierarchs.
Hierarchical relations are highly structured, with everyone
and everything having his, her, and its place, represented by
an organizational pyramid in ﬁgure 1. In this cultural environ-
ment, legitimate decisions aremade bypersonswith the proper
authority to make particular types of decisions: “the proper
authority decides.”3 Individualistic relations, by contrast, are
highly ﬂuid, and subject to individual choice, represented by a
network in ﬁgure 1: “I decide.” Fatalistic relations, mean-
while, are tenuous and unreliable, driven by the “whim and
caprice” of others, represented by atomized individuals in ﬁg-
ure 1: “others decide.” Finally, people in egalitarian relations
retain their autonomy by giving everyone an equal voice in
(and thus the power to veto) collective decisions: “we decide.”
The egalitarian desire to “have it all”—that is, to retain indi-
vidual autonomywhile acting collectively—is represented here
by something that looks like a chocolate chip cookie in ﬁgure 1.
Each of these four patterns of social and political relations
is hypothesized to be justiﬁed by and in turn justify (andmake
plausible) particular kinds of values and beliefs. Not surpris-
ingly, cultural theorists hypothesize that individualists value
freedom, egalitarians value equality, hierarchs value order, and
fatalists value (good) luck (see ﬁgure 1; Coyle 1994; Ellis and
Thompson 1997; Swedlow 2008).
THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN CULTURALTHEORY ANDTHE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
MichaelThompsonhas beenparticularly instrumental in char-
acterizing the cultural constructs of nature inDouglas’s theory
(Schwarz andThompson 1990, 8–13;Thompson, Ellis, andWil-
davsky 1990, 26–33). Adapted fromThompson’s work, the con-
structs of nature that are functional for the diﬀerent patterns
of social relations are mapped on the dimensions of social
relations in ﬁgure 1, where a ball in a landscape represents the
constructs of nature:
• In the individualistic construct of nature, the ball is in a
deep pocket, diﬃcult to knock out: this represents nature
as benign, resilient, or even robust or cornucopian.4
• The egalitarian construct of nature is most nearly the
opposite of the individualistic: the ball is perched precar-
iously on top of a pinnacle; the slightest disturbance will
send it irretrievably downhill: this represents nature as
fragile or ephemeral.
• The hierarchical construct of nature combines these two
constructs: the ball is in a shallow pocket; small distur-
bances will not dislodge it, but large ones will; nature is
construed as being benign or resilient within limits,
beyond which it is fragile, ephemeral, or unpredictable.5
• In the fatalistic constructofnature, theball isonaﬂat sur-
face; it can roll in anydirection; this represents theunpre-
dictabilityor capriciousnessofnature; sometimesbenign,
resilient, or even robust or cornucopian, sometimes frag-
ile or ephemeral, without discernable rhyme or reason.
The scientiﬁc debate regarding owls and ecosystems in the
PNW can be characterized as an argument between environ-
mentalists and their academic sympathizers, on the one hand,
and federal and industry scientists, on the other, over how
shallow the pocket was, or whether the ball was in a pocket at
all. However, federal scientists came fairly close to arguing
that ecosystems were unpredictable—being “not only more
complex thanwe think, butmore complex thanwe can think”—
while scientists working for industry argued for the resiliency
and adaptability of the owl and ecosystems. The debate eﬀec-
tively concluded when environmentalists and their academic
sympathizers persuaded federal judges that the ball was tee-
tering on the lip of the pocket or, alternatively, about to fall oﬀ
its pinnacle perch.
From these constructs of nature it is also possible to deduce
the types of environmental policies that each of the four cul-
tural types will pursue. Individualists will oﬀer a hands-on,
transformative approach, which is indeed what the timber
industry advocated: “Tell us what owl habitat looks like and
we’ll grow it.” They suggested building nest boxes and breed-
ing owls in captivity and then shipping the owls between hab-
itat areas rather than retaining old trees with nesting cavities
and providing forested migratory routes for these birds. Egal-
itarians will take a hands-oﬀ, “tread lightly” approach, which
Figure 1
Dimensions of Culture, Types of
Institutions, Political Values, and
Constructs of Nature
Note: Figure 1 previously appeared in Swedlow 2011b.
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is what environmentalists wanted when they advocated the
complete halt of timber harvests that was nearly achieved.
Hierarchs will be activist, but only to a point that is sustain-
able, which was the approach the US Forest Service has his-
torically takenwith respect to timber harvesting. Fatalists will
remain passive in the face of nature’s ﬁckle moods, a position
that (in addition to the egalitarian “tread lightly” approach)
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the approach taken by President Clin-
ton’s scientiﬁc advisers.
CULTURAL SURPRISES, PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA, AND
POLICY CHANGE IN CULTURALTHEORY ANDTHE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
“But if preferences and perception are socially constructed in
such a way as to justify particular patterns of social relations,
how does change ever occur?,” ask Michael Thompson, Rich-
ard Ellis, and AaronWildavsky in their seminal reﬁnement of
Douglas’s theory (1990, 69). “Much the sameway,” they answer,
“as scientiﬁc theories lose and gain adherents: the cumulative
impact of successive anomalies or surprises.” Anomalies and
surprises occur because “nature, for all its accommodating
ways, does not meekly accept every cultural construction we
try to impose on it, and, in ﬁghting back, it generates a coun-
tervailing force: the natural destruction of culture . . .”
In other words, cultural theorists locate a catalyst for sci-
entiﬁc, cultural, and policy change in surprises generated by
encounters with nature in which nature displays properties or
reveals characteristics that are at odds with scientiﬁcally or
culturally generated expectations. Stipulating theworld is one
way and ﬁnding out that it actually appears to be another
leads to a variety of predictable consequences, which can lead
to such changes6 (see also Coyle and Wildavsky 1987; Lock-
hart 1997; Lodge andWegrich 2011, this issue; Swedlow 2011c,
this issue;Wildavsky 1985).
One area where the natural destruction of science, culture,
and policy appeared to occur in the PNWwas in the inﬂuence
changing scientiﬁc understandings of older forests had on for-
est and wildlife science and management. The US Forest Ser-
vice,whichmanagesmostof the federal lands in theregion,had
beenanexemplaryhierarchicallyorganizedfederalagencysince
its founding in the early 1900s. It championed scientiﬁc man-
agement to produce a sustained yield of timber by managing
forests much as one wouldmanage any other crop. The Forest
Service called for theharvestofold-growth forestsnot set aside
as Wilderness Areas or National Parks because it wanted to
replace these slower-growing, decadent, diseased “biological
deserts” with faster growing, healthier, younger stands.
Researchbeginning in theearly 1970schallenged theForest
Service’s view that old-growth forests were lifeless “cellulose
cemeteries” thatneededtobeharvested.Researchersat theH.J.
AndrewsExperimentalForest inOregonfoundthat theseolder
forestswerehometoawidevarietyof interdependent life forms.
Proceeding roughly in parallel with the research of the H.J.
Andrews teamwas the research of wildlife biologist Eric Fors-
manonthe relationshipbetween thenorthernspottedowland
old-growth forests. Environmental groupswere excitedby this
research because it gave them additional reasons to value and,
with respect to the owl, a legalmeans to preserve older forests.
In other words, research on old-growth forest ecosystems,
and speciﬁcally on the relationship between spotted owls and
old-growth, constructed nature in ways that were functional
for egalitarian environmental groups.The development of this
research and environmental groups’ interest in this research
thus is one signiﬁcant area where political cultural conditions
were ripe for punctuated equilibria in policy change to occur.
Accordingly, after obtaining further supportive owl habi-
tat and population modeling analyses from another scientist,
environmentalists began suing the federal land and wildlife
management agencies on behalf of the northern spotted owl.
They argued, and federal judges agreed, that federal land and
wildlife managers were not doing enough to protect the owl,
violating several environmental laws.
No judge played a more signiﬁcant role in facilitating the
rise of ecosystemmanagement in the PNW than district court
JudgeWilliam Dwyer. Not only was he the ﬁrst to enjoin fed-
eral timber sales to protect the owl, but his injunction against
the Forest Service fundamentally altered the politics of the
issue. This temporary but 100% reduction in sales [when
extended to Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands by
another judge’s injunction] created the policywindow for Pres-
identClinton’s scientists to propose and thePresident to imple-
ment a 75% permanent reduction in sales.
JudgeDwyeralsoordered theagencies todevelopplans that
would protect not only the owl but “biological communities.”
Thisorder implied thatonlyanowlmanagementplan thatalso
managed ecosystemswould be suﬃcient to lift the injunction.
Thisorderwas the resultof considerable judicial activism,with
JudgeDwyer ﬁnding amandate for ecosystemmanagement in
regulations written by Forest Service biologists. These regula-
tions required the agency to maintain “viable populations of
vertebrates”onagencylands,arguablygoingbeyondtheEndan-
gered Species Act’s focus on the recovery of individual species,
but not requiring ecosystemmanagement per se. JudgeDwyer
also read another environmental law to require assessment of
theenvironmental impactofowlmanagementonagency lands,
and, furthermore, he allowed the Clinton administration to
extend ecosystem management to BLM lands and to inverte-
brates on both BLM and Forest Service lands.
Judge Dwyer barely acknowledged industry experts in his
opinions that lead to the injunction of Forest Service timber
sales, but he lent an especially sympathetic ear to critiques of
agency owl plans oﬀered by scientists who testiﬁed on behalf
of environmentalists. The conservation strategy developed by
the land and wildlife management agencies aﬀorded vastly
more protection for the owl than set-asides for owl pairs, and
JudgeDwyer initiallywas impressed by this strategy. But Judge
Dwyer was soon persuaded that the agency conservation plan
might not go far enough when government biologists pro-
duced an analysis that suggested that owl populations were
declining faster than previously thought. Then, academic sci-
entists testiﬁed that the owl’s decline might even be worse
than that, having passed a threshold fromwhich the owl could
not recover. This led Judge Dwyer to enjoin Forest Service
timber sales.
The spotted owl cases, relying on scientiﬁcally and cul-
turally surprising new ﬁndings about the owl’s old-growth
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dependence and decline, thus resulted in a dramatic, PE trans-
formation of federal land andwildlifemanagement in an egal-
itarian direction. Judicial injunctions of federal timber sales
reﬂected the egalitarian view of nature as fragile, while court
orders tomanage biological communities, andPresidentClin-
ton’s eﬀort to manage ecosystems, institutionalized the poli-
cies and social and political relationships that egalitarians
preferred.
Thus, CT provides a plausible speciﬁcation of the kinds of
ideas, interests, and institutions that interact to produce PE
change, as well as a plausible speciﬁcation of the kinds of cul-
tural surprises that can lead to PE change. CT consequently
signiﬁcantly strengthens the PE theory of policy and institu-
tional change. 
NOTES
I thankMatt Grossman, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Charles Lockhart, and Chandra
Hunter Swedlow for valuable comments in the preparation of this article. Although
I was not able to implement all of their suggestions, I look forward to addressing
many of these in my future work. This research was supported by the Bradley and
Earhart Foundations and by the Institute for the Study of the Environment, Sus-
tainability, and Energy at Northern Illinois University.
1. Due to space constraints, this article focuses more on cultural surprises as
sources of PE change in policy than in institutions, although sudden, big
changes of both kinds occurred as the result of the cultural surprises in this
case. See Swedlow 2011b for a cultural analysis of institutional changes
in theUSForest Service and its relationship to theUSFish andWildlife Ser-
vice that were coproduced with the policy changes analyzed here.
2. By the extent of collectivization, I mean the extent to which those in a
pattern of social relations make Us versus Them distinctions, i.e., the ex-
tent to which the pattern is deﬁned by an external group boundary. By the
extent of individual autonomy, I mean the extent to which individuals in a
pattern of social relations are free from coercion and are free to act as they
please; individual autonomy implies some personal power or eﬃcacy. The
following description of Douglas’s cultural theory tracks that found in
Thompson, Ellis, andWildavsky (1990) fairly closely. However, I have
relabeled their dimensions to make their theory “translate” better into
terms that social scientists already understand. Thus, the extent of collec-
tivization in a social organization corresponds to the extent of “group” in
their formulation, while the extent of individual autonomy corresponds
(inversely) to the extent of “grid.”
3. These characterizations of appropriate decision-making authority are
adapted from Lotte Jensen (1999).
4. Thompson claims “nature resilient” is a “meta-myth” that subsumes the
other four constructs of nature (Thompson, Ellis, andWildavsky 1990, 26,
29–32).
5. Thompson calls this “nature perverse/tolerant” (Schwarz and Thompson
1990, 9).
6. See ﬁgure 4 in Thompson, Ellis, andWildavsky (1990, 71), for a typology
of cultural changes; see also Coyle andWildavsky (1987); Lockhart (1997);
andWildavsky (1985).
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